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Abstract
Potato late blight remains a threat to food security and livelihood of millions of people in Ethiopia. Despite a rapid dispersal of the
disease pathogen and farmers’ interdependency in managing it, the literature on agricultural extension and communication tends
to frame the disease and its management as a problem of the individual farmer. This study appreciates late blight as a collective
action problem whose management requires a corresponding re-configuration in information sharing and communicative prac-
tices. We employ a framed field game experiment with a mixed quantitative and qualitative method to explore how and to what
extent different types and combinations of communicative interventions affect collective action in the management of the disease
among farmers in Ethiopia. Interestingly, our quantitative findings revealed that the provision of technical information about
interdependency involved in the management of the disease and social monitoring information about the management practices
of other farmers negatively affected collective action. However, collective action performance significantly improved when
farmers were given the opportunity to interactively communicate about their management strategies. Further qualitative inves-
tigation sheds light on how farmers used and made sense of the different communicative interventions to inform and adjust their
individual decisions, coordinate collective strategies, pressure free-riders, and develop a shared identity. It is concluded that
interventions that mainly promote the provision of technical and social information can be counterproductive in managing
collective action problems such as late blight unless it is complemented with interactive communication and deliberation
processes.
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1 Introduction
Potato late blight, caused by Phytophthora infestans (Mont.)
de Bary, is the major bottleneck in potato production, a crop
that holds promise for food security and livelihood improve-
ment to millions of people in Ethiopia (Demissie 2019;
Tsedaley 2014). Since late blight came to the spotlight for
being the cause of the Irish potato famine in the 1840s, it
has been the most studied (and still among the most destruc-
tive) potato diseases in many parts of the world (Campos and
Ortiz 2019; Kirk and Wharton 2014). The disease develops
and spreads rapidly under high relative humidity, moderate
temperature, and substantial rainfall, and has the potential to
destroy the whole potato field within a few days (Burke 2017;
Kirk and Wharton 2014).
Rooted in traditional agricultural extension and technology
adoption model (Rogers 1995), communicative research and
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development interventions to deal with the problem of late
blight tend to frame the disease as a problem of the individ-
ual farmer. This is reflected in interventions that advocate a
linear form of advisory approaches geared towards the pro-
motion of adoption of disease management technologies
and practices at the level of individual farmers or house-
holds (Pernezny et al. 2016; Tsedaley 2014; Bekele et al.
2012; Mekonen et al. 2011; Miller et al. 2006; Franc 1998).
There is a normative expectation that something considered
desirable can spread across a larger number of users (Peng
et al. 2018; Leeuwis 2010). Nevertheless, recent studies in a
resource-poor smallholder farmer context stress that the
rapid dispersal of the late blight pathogen across farm
boundaries gives the management of the disease a collective
action problem feature (Damtew et al. 2018; Tafesse et al.
2018). Meaning, lack of control of the disease by any indi-
vidual farmer imposes costs or losses on other nearby
farmers and likewise, control efforts by one farmer can con-
fer a benefit to other nearby farmers (Graham et al. 2019).
Because of this characteristic of the disease and its causing
agent, the management of late blight is regarded as one
among specific types of collective action problems in the
domain of “public bads” (e.g., infectious and invasive spe-
cies, microbial resistance to antimicrobial agents, global
warming, air pollution) (Costello et al. 2017).
In a broader sense, a collective action problem is a situation
in which all individuals would be better off cooperating but
fail to do so because of conflicting interests between individ-
ual and collective goals (Olson 2009). The role of information
and communication in overcoming collective action problems
has been highlighted in seminal papers (Ostrom 1992; Ostrom
and Walker 1991; Sell and Wilson 1991) and more recent
literature, mainly in the field of behavioral economics
(Cabrales et al. 2016; Opdam et al. 2016; Reuben and Riedl
2013; Smith 2010; Milinski et al. 2008; Cardenas et al. 2004).
In fact, Sell and Wilson (1991) argued that information and
communication are among the most important factors to in-
fluence cooperative behavior among interdependent individ-
uals in a collective action problem situation. In this regard,
many game-based experimental studies have been conducted
in laboratory and field settings to study how the provision of
social monitoring information (about practices of others) and/
or group communication influence collective action among
interdependent individuals. However, literature in the field
of behavioral economics has put emphasis on social monitor-
ing information with limited attention to other types of infor-
mation that could highlight interdependency originating from
the ecological characteristics of the collective action problem
at hand. For instance, Steingröver et al. (2010) emphasized
that information about the multiple biophysical features
(e.g., pest and disease dynamics in crops, landscape services,
habitat for biodiversity and antagonists) is a potentially pow-
erful way of illuminating interdependencies and the need for
collective action among members of a community. Similarly,
the provision of technical information about interdependency
in relation to the collective risk and benefits of individual
management practices can play an important role in influenc-
ing collective action in the management of the disease. As a
separate research topic, a large body of experimental evidence
exists on the role of group communication in overcoming
collective action problems. What is largely missing in the
latter domain of research is a systematic investigation of the
underlying mechanisms that can give a robust explanation of
how or why group communication influences collective
action.
As further conceptualized and argued in detail in Section 2,
this study designed a framed field game experiment that
brought together three different types of communicative inter-
ventions to stimulate collective action in the management of
potato late blight in Ethiopia. The first intervention was to
provide technical information about interdependency in man-
aging the disease (fungicide spraying). The second interven-
tion added social monitoring information, that is, information
about the practices of other farmers. The third intervention
added a group communication element that gave space for
farmers to interactively communicate about their collective
problem and its management.
Given the increased availability of ICTs (Information and
Communication Technologies) in rural settings and their pre-
sumed ability to facilitate network formation, dialog, and
learning, there is also a growing research interest in
experimenting with different communicative and information-
al functions in collective action problem situations using such
technologies (Cieslik et al. 2018; Bennett and Segerberg
2012). Mobile phones and related technologies can particular-
ly play meaningful roles in facilitating communication among
spatially and temporally distributed individuals (Bennett and
Segerberg 2012). Correspondingly, the group communication
(third intervention) was supported by an internet-supported
smartphone application (Voxer) that enabled farmers to com-
municate through voice and text messages. Farmers were giv-
en smartphones and had the opportunity to talk to each other
about their individual or collective strategies to deal with their
collective problem.
This study is primarily interested in understanding how and
to what extent the different types of communicative interven-
tions influence farmers’ collective action in the management
of potato late blight. In doing so, it also assesses the potential
advantages and disadvantages of using smartphones as a plat-
form for group communication.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 further details the
theoretical argumentation that led to our specific hypotheses
and research inquiries. Section 3 covers the methodology in
which the experimental design, the experimental procedure,
the game framing, and the quantitative and qualitative data
analysis approaches are presented. The results of the study
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are reported in Section 4. Sections 5 and 6 presents the dis-
cussion and conclusion part, respectively.
2 Literature review and hypotheses
2.1 Communicative interventions in collective action
problems
Communicative intervention is the professional use of commu-
nication to help resolve problematic situations or to achieve so-
cietal ends (Leeuwis and Aarts 2011; Leeuwis 2004). In the
context of crop disease management in general, and that of
late- light prevention and control in particular, the dominant form
of communicative intervention has been agricultural extension
(Pande et al. 2009; Ciancio and Mukerji 2008). Such type of
communicative intervention is informed by early adoption theo-
ries and social-psychological models that aim to influence cli-
ents’ innovation decisions in a direction deemed desirable by a
communication intervener (e.g., Rogers 1995; Petty and
Cacioppo 1986). Such individualistic perspectives have been
criticized by recent scholarship in the field for their simplistic
notion of adoption decision and the lack of attention for social
and institutional dimensions of innovation (Leeuwis 2004). This
is indeed a limitation in view of the fact that late blight manage-
ment is a collective action problem as farmers are interdependent
in their efforts in managing the disease. More in general, it has
been argued that rural innovation has collective dimensions and
that other forms of communicative intervention or innovation
intermediations are needed (e.g., facilitation of learning or space
for negotiation, conflict management, and everyday communi-
cation) (Leeuwis 2004). Communication interventions can have
broader roles than providing information-based advisory ser-
vices or applying persuasive strategies that are aimed at influenc-
ing individual behavior (Klerkx et al. 2009; Klerkx and Leeuwis
2008). Such innovation scholars, however, mostly look at col-
lective dimensions and new forms of communicative interven-
tions in terms of resolving coordination in multi-stakeholder set-
tings (e.g., among actors in value chains). They have not partic-
ularly looked at the specific communicative challenges in collec-
tive action situations or in the management of public bads that
involve interdependent individuals. In this paper, we deal with a
horizontal and mutual type of interdependencies among farmers
rather than the type of interdependencies in multi-stakeholder
settings that can be vertical and multi-level. It is deemed that
interdependent farmers involved in a collective action problem
situation do not only need information on the ecological charac-
teristics of the problem that make them interdependent, but they
also require various types of information on the behaviors of
others onwhich they depend tomeaningfully govern their shared
problem (Leeuwis and Aarts 2020; Ostrom 2009). In line with
this broader function of information, we develop our hypotheses
to test the effect of several communicative interventions on
collective action among farmers involved in infectious crop dis-
ease management.
In the context of collective action problems, a communica-
tive intervention can be designed around the provision of in-
formation with the aim of explicating the ecological features
of the disease management problem that makes individuals
interdependent (Peng et al. 2018; Ostrom 1999). Costello
et al. (2017) argued that knowing the spatial connectivity in-
duced by the mobility of public bad resources influences pri-
vate decisions, which collectively can have important conse-
quences for control across a spatial domain. In our study con-
text, farmers have very limited knowledge of the spreading
feature of the late blight pathogen and the collective risk and
benefit of individual management decisions (Damtew et al.
2020; Tafesse et al. 2018). In this regard, evidence from a
systematic investigation of the role of such type of communi-
cative intervention in collective action problems is sparse. The
first hypothesis is that knowing or having technical informa-
tion on the interdependency that originates from the collective
risk and benefit of the individual management practice could
positively contribute to farmers’ collective action or coopera-
tion in managing late blight.
Hypothesis 1: Providing technical information about in-
terdependency resulting from the collective risks and
benefits of individual management practices will improve
collective action among farmers in managing late blight.
Communicative interventions can also be designed around
the provision of social monitoring1 information on behavior or
practices of others involved in the management of collective
action problems (Khadjavi et al. 2017; Martin et al. 2014;
Milinski et al. 2008). There exists a large body of experimen-
tal literature in the economics field that attempted to examine
the role of social monitoring information in collective action.
A key motivation for these studies has been a disregard to the
types of uncertainty that people face in real-life because of
lack of behavioral information (Choi and Lee 2014;
Andreoni and Petrie 2004). It is contended that in reality,
decision-makers operate in a limited information environment
or do not always have information on what others are doing to
use the information as a reference point for future decisions
(Martin et al. 2014; Andreoni and Petrie 2004). In this respect,
evidences from a range of experimental studies presented in-
consistent findings whereby some showed a positive effect of
social monitoring information on collective action (Khadjavi
et al. 2017; Janssen et al. 2010; Smith 2010; Crawford 1998),
whereas others found no effect (Hashim et al. 2011; Marks
and Croson 1999; Weimann 1994; Sell and Wilson 1991).
However, none of the reviewed literature has made an attempt
1 Different terms like “Information,” “Behavioral information,” “Decision in-
formation” are used in the economics literature.
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to examine the role of social monitoring information taking
into account whether individuals have knowledge of the eco-
logical characteristics of the problem that make them interde-
pendent. Accordingly, we anticipate that having access to so-
cial monitoring information would positively contribute to
collective action when farmers are aware of their interdepen-
dency from the collective risks and benefits of individual man-
agement practices. Moreover, the contribution of social mon-
itoring information can depend on whether or not farmers
know their interdependency from the collective risks and ben-
efits of individual management practices.
Hypothesis 2: Providing social monitoring information
on the management practices/decisions of others as well
as technical information to make farmers aware of their
interdependency will further enhance collective action
among farmers.
and
Hypothesis 3: The role of social monitoring information on
collective action is influenced by whether or not farmers
have technical information about interdependency.
A separate strand of economics literature has its focus on
understanding the role of group communication or “cheap
talk” on collective action. By creating a sort of a discursive
space, the opportunity to communicate is viewed as a mecha-
nism that enables individuals to discuss, negotiate, or coordi-
nate strategies to deal with their collective action problem
(Balliet 2010; Dietz et al. 2003; Marks and Croson 1999;
Ostrom 1992). A number of experimental studies reported a
positive effect of communication on collective action (Cason
et al. 2012; Bachi et al. 2010; Smith 2010; Bochet et al. 2006).
However, taking into account the wider intermediary role of a
communicative intervention, none of the reviewed literature
made an attempt to integrate and investigate the effect of
group communication together with the other types of com-
municative interventions (provision of social monitoring in-
formation and technical information about interdependency)
on collective action. Accordingly, we hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 4: An opportunity to communicate on top of
social monitoring information on practices of others and
technical information about interdependency will result in
the highest level of collective action in managing late blight.
2.2 Beneath the relationship between communicative
interventions and collective action
Previous experimental studies are rarely supported with expla-
nations of the mechanisms underpinning the relationship
between communicative intervention and collective action.
There is a limited evidence-based account of how or why a
particular communicative intervention contributed to the ob-
served variations in collective action. In this regard, we pro-
pound that a deeper examination of the role of communicative
interventions in collective action problem situations is of con-
siderable scientific and practical relevance. Some plausible
explanations are suggested in literature as to how a group
communication, as one specific type of communicative inter-
vention, can influence collective action behavior. First, com-
munication provides the opportunity to coordinate a collective
strategy through clarifying confusion and facilitating discus-
sions on incentives and trade-offs between individual and col-
lective goals. Second, communication can also help people
offer or extract promises of cooperation and detect and pres-
sure free-riding behaviors. A third explanation is that commu-
nication permits subjects to create or reinforce a sense of
group identity that could help motivate cooperative behavior
(Peng et al. 2018; D’Exelle et al. 2012; Garicano and Wu
2012; Balliet 2010; Cardenas et al. 2004; Dietz et al. 2003).
Informed by these perspectives on group communication and
other emergent themes for the other types of communicative
interventions, this study qualitatively explains how our com-
municative interventions influenced collective action behav-
iors in the management of late blight.
Similarly, in any type of communicative intervention, the
medium of communication potentially has a number of en-
abling or constraining functional qualities (Leeuwis 2004).
As our group communication was supported with an
internet-enabled smartphone application, we are further inter-
ested in assessing the implication of using the platform as part
of the wider role of the group communication environment.
This means that our focus is not to investigate the contribution
of the platform to collective action performance. Instead, our
interest lies in assessing specific challenges, advantages, or
disadvantages of using the platform as one type of communi-
cation channel when farmers communicate to coordinate their
strategies or pressure free-riding behavior, or create/develop a
shared identity in the management of their collective problem.
3 Methodology
The study is based on a mixed quantitative and qualitative
analysis of a framed field game experiment conducted with
real-life potato growers suffering from potato late blight dis-
ease. In line with the order of our research inquiry, the meth-
odology section has two major sub-sections. The first sub-
section (3.1–3.3) covers the quantitative part on the experi-
mental design and procedure, the game framing, the data
source, and method of analysis. The second sub-section
(3.4) describes the data collection and analysis for the quali-
tative part of the study.
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3.1 Experimental design
Our experiment simulated the management of potato late
blight as a collective action problem whereby farmers have
to make individual decisions/actions to spray or not to spray
their own field but their level of success to control the disease
depends not only on their individual action but also on the
actions of other neighboring farmers. It was hypothesized that
the proportion of farmers that are in a group meeting, the
threshold (level of collective action) would be different for
the types of communicative interventions.
Four experimental conditions were used to investigate how
farmers respond to the different types of communicative inter-
ventions. Hence, the roles of the different types of communi-
cation interventions were tested under four intervention con-
ditions against a non-intervention condition (Table 1).
1. In the non-intervention, farmer groups were not provided
with any of the information types (technical information
and social monitoring information) and were not given the
opportunity to communicate with each other.
2. In the 1st intervention, the farmer groups were provided
with technical information about interdependency or the
collective risk and benefit of individual spraying practices
(Hypothesis 1).
3. In the 2nd intervention, the farmer groups were provided
with technical information about interdependency and so-
cial monitoring information on the spraying decisions of
others (Hypothesis 2).
4. In the 3rd intervention, the farmer groups were only given
social monitoring information on the spraying decisions
of others (Hypothesis 3).
5. In the 4th intervention, on top of technical information
about interdependency and social monitoring informa-
tion, the farmer groups had the opportunity to communi-
cate with each other (Hypothesis 4).
A total of 225 farmers were involved from the Wolmera
district in the central highlands of Ethiopia. Out of the 23 rural
kebeles2 in the district, nine kebeles with extensive potato
production were purposely selected. From a list of all villages
(got’es) within a kebele, five villages were then randomly
drawn. Finally, five farmers were randomly selected from all
inhabitants of each village making a total of 25 participant
farmers from each kebele. The farmers from one village were
distributed randomly over the five intervention and non-
intervention groups. In this way, we reduced a potential bias
we could have encountered if neighboring farmers in the non-
communicating groups would have a chance to physically
identify each other, hence communicate. Thus, each
intervention and non-intervention condition was tested with
45 farmers (9 groups of five farmers) from the diverse kebeles.
3.2 Implementation procedure
The experiment was conducted in the nine kebeles one after
the other, and each experiment or game session took three
days per kebele following a standard procedure. First, the
objective of the experiment was explained and farmers’ will-
ingness to participate was obtained. It was also made clear to
them that if they happen to be in the communication interven-
tion group, their conversation would be recorded on the
smartphone for a research purpose and this was confirmed
with a consent form. Farmers from the same village then drew
a lottery to go into the different intervention and non-
intervention groups and were given a unique identifier. All
participants from all groups were then administered with a
registration checklist containing general socio-economic and
potato production practice-related questions. Two parallel
information-sharing sessions that approximately took 45 min
were held with farmers in all intervention and non-
intervention groups. The session for intervention 1, interven-
tion 2, and intervention 4 was about the interdependency orig-
inating from the collective risk and benefit of individual man-
agement practices. The session with farmers in the non-
intervention and intervention 3 was on potato nutrition, a topic
with little connection to their fungicide spray decision making
choices. All the farmers then came together for a chart-based
explanation on the game framing as detailed in Section 3.3.
3.3 Game framing
Farmers were informed that they would be compensated for
their time in the game, they were guaranteed to take home 600
Ethiopian Birr (about 22 USD then), and in the best-case sce-
nario, they could take home 1200 ETB. It was explained that
they were going to participate in a game where they all played
themselves as potato farmers. It was emphasized that late
blight is a disease that can spread from field to field, as it is
air-borne, and any unsprayed field at the time of disease oc-
currence would be a source of infection to neighboring fields.
In reality, all farmers spray fungicide to control late blight and
the point of the game was for them to decide about fungicide
spraying which is a real-life investment that they make to
control the late blight disease. They could choose not to spray,
to spray once, twice, thrice, or four times during the whole
game. The game with four rounds was assumed to represent
one potato growing season as farmers also make multiple
spraying decisions in a particular growing season. They were
informed that the game was played in a group of five people
that were anonymous to each other and the group success in
managing late blight depended not only on the decision of the
individuals but also on the decisions of others in the group.2 The smallest official government administrative unit in Ethiopia
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Before the first game round, everyone received an initial
endowment of 600 ETB which symbolized the amount of
money they spent to buy the required quantity of fungicide
in a particular growing season. If their decision was to spray,
they needed to put a 100 ETB note in an envelope and secretly
put it in a ballot box. If they chose not to spray, they would
submit an empty envelope.
If a group reached a total investment of 1500 ETB by the
end of the fourth round, it meant that they managed to protect
their field from late blight. If their investment was below 1500
ETB, the disease hit and caused damage. After the end of the
fourth decision, there would be a harvest time that depended
on their individual and group contribution or the number of
fungicide application.
1. When a group managed to reach the threshold of 1500
ETB, every player received an extra 600 ETB as a “suc-
cessful harvest” money. Every player also kept the money
they had left from their initial endowment of 600 ETB. For
instance, if a farmer sprayed only two times (200 ETB) and
his group controlled the disease, he would receive 600 ETB
harvest money and also kept his remaining 400 ETB taking
home a total of 1000 ETB. In this way, the amount of
“take-home” money could differ between farmers based
on their spraying decision creating a dilemma situation.
2. When a group did not reach the threshold of 1500 ETB, it
meant that the spraying was not enough, the late blight hit
the crop, and their harvest was affected. In such a case, if
an individual in a group sprayed four times, it meant that
s/he managed to control the late blight a bit and his/her
harvest got him/her 400 ETB. Three times spraying got
him/her 300 ETB. Two times spraying got him/her 200
ETB. One time spraying got him/her 100 ETB. Zero
spraying got him/her nothing or 0 ETB. Although the
harvest money of individuals in a losing scenario
depended on the number of individual sprayings, they
also kept the money left in their pocket at the end and
everyone finally took home 600 ETB. Apart from a way
of compensating farmers for participating in the game,
this was with the assumption that farmers, as rational de-
cision-makers, normally aim for controlling the disease
(get better harvest). However, they still have a dilemma
situation or an incentive to free-ride and save more money
in their pocket with the hope that other group members
might contribute enough to control the disease.
After the explanation, all participants, with the exception of
the communicating groups, went straight to making their first
spraying decision. The communicating groups were separate-
ly given a small hands-on training on the use of the
smartphones, the group communication app (Voxer) with a
nudge that if they saw a need they would have a chance to
communicate within their group members about the game.
The communication groups then went to their first round of
decisions.
The first decision was made on the first day, the second
decision on the morning of the second day, the third deci-
sion in the late afternoon of the second day, and the last
decision was made on the morning of the third day. Unlike
the conventional multiple round game procedure (Milinski
et al. 2008) where each round continued right after the
former, we let players have at least eight hours between
rounds so that farmers in the communicating group would
have the opportunity to communicate if they saw the need.
After each round of the game, only players in intervention
2, 3, and 4 were individually given social monitoring in-
formation or information on the decision of others in their
group.
3.4 Quantitative data and analysis
Spraying decisions of 225 farmers from all intervention and
non-intervention groups were used as the data source for the
quantitative analysis. Within the different intervention and
non-intervention groups, if a farmer was in a group that
reached the threshold of 1500 ETB after 4 rounds of spraying
decisions, s/he was given a value of 1 and if s/he was in a
group that did not meet the threshold after 4 rounds of
spraying decisions, s/he was given a value of 0.
Accordingly, we had 225 data points produced from a total
of 900 spraying decisions. The effect of the four interventions
(interventions 1, 2, 3, and 4) was compared relative to the non-
intervention group. To improve the precision of our estimates,
the measurement of the effect of the different interventions
was controlled for individual attributes (age, sex, education,
household size, potato farm size, perceived late blight serious-
ness, mainly seed producer, mainly ware producer, mobile
phone ownership, and smartphone ownership) and kebele
fixed effects. We used multiple linear regression to estimate
our outcome variable which was the likelihood of reaching a
goal (threshold) to control late blight under the different
Table 1 Conditions
Non-intervention No technical information; no social monitoring information; no communication
Intervention 1 Technical information
Intervention 2 Technical information and social monitoring information
Intervention 3 Social monitoring information
Intervention 4 Technical information; social monitoring information; communication
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communicative intervention conditions. The model used to
estimate reads:
Y i ¼ C þ αTi þ βX i þ K þ εi
where Yi is the value of the threshold variable for respondent i,
Ti is the intervention dummy, C is the constant term or the
value of Yi when all the other variables are equal to zero. Xi is a
vector of control for individual attributes,K is the kebele fixed
effect, and ϵi is a random error term. α is the coefficient of
interest identifying the effect of the interventions on reaching
the threshold. The regressions were done on the STATA ver-
sion 15.1 software package.
3.5 Qualitative information and analysis
In order to understand the underlying mechanisms as to
how the different communication interventions were
influencing farmers’ decisions and the role of smartphones
as a medium of communication, qualitative data were gen-
erated from two sources. Individual interviews were con-
ducted with a total of 27 participant farmers, selecting 3
farmers from each kebele. The interviews were done right
after the end of the game in each kebele so that farmers still
had fresh memory on their overall experience. The check-
list for the interviews was developed in such a way that it
encouraged farmers to share their reflections on the differ-
ent communicative interventions and the way they related
the game with their real-life situation as potato growers.
The second qualitative data source used to explain the
mechanisms behind the quantitative findings was the re-
cording of the phone conversations of the farmers that were
given the opportunity to communicate. When farmers
came to play between each round of the game, the records
were constantly downloaded and the phones cleaned up for
the next round of conversation. All the qualitative infor-
mation from the interviews and the phone records were
fully translated and transcribed from the local languages
“Afan Oromo” and “Amharic.”
The transcribed information from interviews and phone
conversations were uploaded on ATLAS.ti software as
separate files. Three code categories (Coordinating collec-
tive strategy, Discouraging free-riding behavior, and
Creating a sense of group identity) were created in line
with the reviewed conceptual literature on communicative
intervention and collective action in Section 2.2. The tran-
scribed information from the two different sources was
then openly coded into the three code categories. An in-
ductive analysis of the transcribed information also gener-
ated another three themes (Understanding interdependen-
cy, Learn about others’ behavior and adjust own decision,
and Implications of using the smartphones) that mainly
investigated farmers’ opinion and sense-making of the
technical information on interdependency, social monitor-
ing information, and (dis-)advantages of using the
smartphones as a communication medium.
4 Results
In a brief descriptive part, Section 4.1 presents some general
information about potato cultivation and late blight disease in
the study sample area. Findings from the quantitative analysis
related to our hypotheses are outlined in Section 4.2.
Section 4.3 presents a qualitative explanation of how our com-
munication intervention contributed to the observed differ-
ences in collective action. The last section (4.4) explores some
of the contextual implications of using smartphones for
communication.
4.1 General information about the study population
The livelihood of most farmers in the study area is primar-
ily dependent on the cultivation of potato, cereals such as
wheat, barley, and pulses such as faba beans and chick-
peas. Some farmers also engage in off-farm activities,
mainly as daily laborers in nearby private flower farms
and a cement factory to generate additional income. As
the study district is located in one of the biggest potato-
producing areas in the country, potato cultivation is by far
the most important source of livelihood for farmers.
Table 2 gives a general summary of the relative importance
of potato cultivation to farmers’ livelihood compared to
other income sources in the study area. More than 99%
of the respondent farmers labeled potato cultivation as very
important or important.
Farmers’ perception of the problem of late blight is another
important factor in their efforts in managing the disease. The
farmers rated the extent of the problem of late blight to their
potato cultivation. The disease was categorized as either a
serious or a very serious problem by 80% of the farmers and
99% of the respondent farmers labeled it as a problem
(Table 3).
Table 2 Importance of potato cultivation for livelihood
Rating Frequency Percent Cumulative (%)
Very unimportant 1 0.4 0.4
Unimportant 0 0.0 0.4
Important 20 8.9 9.3
Very important 204 90.7 100.0
Total 225 100.0
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4.2 Variations among the different communicative
interventions
The regression outputs on the effect of the different commu-
nicative interventions on the level of collective action in the
management of late blight are presented here.
4.2.1 Hypothesis 1
In the first hypothesis, we predicted that having technical
information about interdependency on the collective risk
and benefit of individual management practice (fungicide
spraying) would have a positive effect on farmers’ collec-
tive action performance. Contrary to our expectation, the
interdependency information did not trigger farmers to col-
lectively act (Table 4). In fact, while about 45% of the
farmers were in the non-intervention groups that reached
the threshold, with technical information about interdepen-
dency, only 33% of farmers were in groups reaching the
threshold. The difference is not statistically significant.
4.2.2 Hypothesis 2
In the second hypothesis, we expected that additional so-
cial monitoring information on the decision of other group
members (Table 4) would further enhance collective action
among farmers. Interestingly, having such information on
top of the technical information significantly worsened
(p = 0.012) collective action performance. Again, conflict-
ing with our hypothesis, the additional social monitoring
information further impeded the performance of the
groups; only 34% of the farmers were in groups that
reached the threshold. This is the only intervention group
where male farmers performed significantly better than
their female counterparts. However, with the small number
of female farmers (4 farmers) in the group, a note of cau-
tion is to refrain from using this information as evidence of
a meaningful positive effect on male farmers than on their
female counterparts.
4.2.3 Hypothesis 3
Our assumption was that the role of social monitoring infor-
mation on collective action only is not sufficient to stimulate
collective action and farmers need technical information about
their interdependency in addition. However, our analysis
(Table 4) showed that having only social monitoring informa-
tion had a positive effect on farmers’ collective action perfor-
mance. In this intervention condition, 57% of the farmers were
in groups that reached the threshold, which is 29% higher
relative to the non-intervention condition. This provides evi-
dence that the influence of social monitoring information on
collective action indeed depends on whether or not farmers
Table 3 Importance of late blight as a problem
Rating Frequency Percent Cumulative
Not a problem 2 0.9 0.9
A mild problem 43 19.1 20.0
A serious problem 63 28.0 48.0




threshold levels as a measure of
collective action










Technical information about interdependency 33 (0.0692) 0.125 0.679
Technical information about interdependency +
social monitoring information
34 (0.037)* 0.012 0.910
Social monitoring information 57 (0.040) * 0.002 0.912
Technical information about interdependency +
social monitoring information + group
communication
56 (0.039) * 0.003 0.903




*p < 0.05. Additional controls include age, male dummy, education level, household size, potato farm size,
perceived late blight seriousness; mainly seed producer; mainly ware producer; mobile phone ownership;
smartphone ownership. See Tables A1–A4 in the Supplementary material for full details of the control variables
and their coefficients
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have technical information about their interdependency. This
finding also signals the uncertainty of using only social mon-
itoring information to explain the role of information in alter-
ing collective action performance.
4.2.4 Hypothesis 4
Finally, we predicted that allowing people to communicate on
top of the technical information about interdependency and so-
cial monitoring information would produce the highest level of
collective action. As can be inferred from Table 4, having the
opportunity to communicate has noticeably improved collective
action among the farmers in managing the disease. In this inter-
vention condition, 56% of the farmers were in groups that
reached the threshold. This is a significant (p= 0.003) increase
of 27% relative to the performance of farmers in the non-
intervention condition. The increase in performance was even
more dramatic when one notices the neutralization of the nega-
tive effect of technical information and social monitoring infor-
mation when the opportunity to communicate is given. In this
regard, there was a 65% increase in collective action perfor-
mance relative to the farmers in the intervention group that has
both technical information and social monitoring information.
4.3 How did the communicative intervention
influence collective action?
This result section presents detailed qualitative explanations
underlying the observed effect of the communicative interven-
tions on collective action. The first two themes (Sections 4.3.1
and 4.3.2) mainly relate to the communicative interventions
on the provision of technical information and social monitor-
ing information. The rest of the themes (Sections 4.3.3, 4.3.4,
and 4.3.5) cover explanations about the role of group commu-
nication in influencing collective action performance.
4.3.1 Understanding interdependency
In contrast with the assumptions, farmers’ awareness of their
interdependency through technical information has actually
encouraged them to pursue an individualistic goal or to free-
ride. Farmers’ statements on why they would spray their field
or advise neighbors to do the same when they saw late blight
symptoms in their own or their neighbors’ fields attested this
tendency. On his new perspective on interdependency and the
“benefit” that could come with it, a farmer said, “Today, we saw
an interesting thing. We understood the transmission of potato
late blight from someone’s field to other farmers’ fields. For
example, if there are 10 hectares of potato field in an area and
if 8 hectares got sprayed, the sprayed fields may help in reducing
late blight on the fields that never got sprayed.” Another farmer
described the dilemma situation they were in, “There are some
individuals in dilemma thinking about the advantage they may
get from farmers spraying their potato field near their own field.”
Similarly, a farmer shared his opinion on why some farmers in
his group did not contribute to the collective management of the
disease, “The reason why some farmers didn’t contribute to
spraying is that they hoped that if their neighbors would spray,
they would benefit from them.”.
Contrary to this dominant tendency, the understanding of in-
terdependency stimulated some farmers to be more cooperative
or show altruistic behavior. A farmer stated his willingness to
even compensate for other farmers, “I spray for fear of the spread
of late blight to my field. Even if the person lacks money for
buying a chemical, I have to help him in buying the chemical.”
The realization of this type of interdependency influenced anoth-
er farmer to say, “So far, I have been doing nothing even if I see
late blight on others’ fields. But, after this training, I understood
the importance of discussing with the other farmers and mobilize
them for spraying in order to manage the disease. I also realize
even to sue a person if s/he is not willing to spray.”
4.3.2 Learn about others’ behavior and adjust own decision
The provision of social monitoring information on the deci-
sion of other group members after each round of the game
appeared to stimulate farmers to adjust their own decision.
Knowing about the choices of other farmers without being
able to communicate with their group members, the farmers
appeared to rely on their individual judgments only and make
choices either to compensate for free-riders or to free-ride
themselves. As can be seen in the following interview quotes,
some farmers covered for free-riders within their groups.
“When I heard others didn’t contribute to managing the dis-
ease, I decided to provide extra contribution.”was a statement
from a farmer. Another frustrated farmer shared his experi-
ence, “I sprayed all the time because others were not, but it
is sad we still failed!” Even though no farmer during the in-
terview dared to say that s/he free-ridded after learning the
behaviors of others, our quantitative result has provided evi-
dence that the effect of having additional information on the
contribution of others negatively affected collective action
performance. This meant that the dominant strategy was to
decide to free-ride when farmers learned their group members
were not contributing enough.
4.3.3 Coordinating collective strategy
Under the condition of group communication, the farmers
discussed their performance after each round of the game
and coordinated their collective spraying strategy. They ex-
plained their efforts to organize themselves in terms of a col-
lective goal, “Well, I hear the voicemail and get all the sug-
gestions from the other people and discuss how much is left to
reach the target......; “We talked about the amount collected in
each round andwemade suggestions on the amount that needs
263Communicative interventions for collective management of crop diseases
to be contributed between rounds...”; “Three of us discussed
how to get to the target but we failed as a group because two
farmers were not communicating with us.” Correspondingly,
farmers being the subject of the other communicative inter-
ventions described how they could have benefited if they had
a chance to interact beforemaking decisions. A farmer uttered,
“It would have helped us advise each other about what to do
prior to giving decisions to spray or not to spray.” Another
farmer added, “we would have discussed that we have con-
tributed this amount of money on the first round and advised
each other on the amount of money to contribute on the sec-
ond and third rounds.”
Voice records on the smartphones of the communicating
groups provided a strong account of the considerable effort
devoted by farmers to calculate and check their collective
performance. A farmer emphasized, “You heard our score
and we missed 100 ETB today. Please let’s try to compensate
for the gap by contributing at least 200 birr.” Another farmer
voiced, “Today is the last day of the game. We, my group,
have contributed around 1000 birr. So, contribute the rest and
don’t try to save the money.”When a farmer realized that they
had already met the target before the last round, he prompted,
“We have contributed 1500 birr. So, don’t contribute hereaf-
ter, because contributing more than 1500 is meaningless.”
There was one striking finding that is of relevance in un-
derstanding the overall influence of the communicative inter-
ventions and particularly on farmers’ efforts to coordinate a
collective strategy. Despite their understanding of the disease
controlling strategy in the game, some farmers tended to apply
spraying practices they have in their real-life. Conversation
records revealed how these farmers insisted to stick to their
actual fungicide spraying routine even when they knew it did
not correspond with the optimal strategy in the hypothetical
scenario. A farmer asserted, “As you know, we have an expe-
rience of spraying up to four times in our area. According to
the trainers, contributing 1500 birr (each spraying three times
on average) is enough. But I don’t think this is acceptable.
Spraying four times is important to get better production. So,
each of our groupmembers has to contribute 100 Birr in all the
four rounds.” Another farmer voiced his dilemma as, “The
plan for managing potato late blight is contributing 1500 birr
or more. But from our experience, we spray a maximum of
two times. If we contribute based on this experience, we will
fail, what should we do?” In an attempt to guide his group
members, a farmer said, “we know how many times we need
to spray to control potato late blight. In this case, spraying one
to two times is enough in managing the disease.”
4.3.4 Discouraging free-riding behavior
For the reason explained in Section 3 of this paper, group
members were anonymous to each other, consequently,
farmers were not in a position to exactly discern between
contributors and non-contributors. However, this did not stop
farmers from putting pressure on free-riders when they knew
that the group was not performing to their expectations. The
phone records clearly captured that the pressure farmers were
trying to exert on cheaters and mobilize other group members
to do the same. A farmer denounced the act of an unknown
cheater and called for intervention from the others saying,
“We should struggle against the personwho did not contribute
to spraying.” With what seemed to be categorizing the use of
the money for another purpose as a deceitful act, a farmer
commented, “I think there are some individuals who use the
money for another purpose.” A farmer who suspected that
farmers, who sometimes sent their contributions through other
farmers, could be the cheaters, said: “Those who are sending
an empty envelope to another person keeping the money in
your pocket have to stop such cheating.”
It is also important to mention that interviewed farmers
believed that the social pressure and, consequently, their col-
lective performance could have been different if they had
known for sure the free-riding individuals within their groups.
“When I suspected someone is cheating, I only tried to strong-
ly advise everyone” was a comment from a farmer who could
not do more than using a triggering strategy. Another farmer
expressed his regrets for not knowing the responsible person
for their group failure, “For example, my group was made of
five that later failed to control the disease because we were
100 Birr less than the threshold. We never got to know who
was responsible!”
4.3.5 Creating a sense of group identity
Given the few days (3) the communicating group interacted, it
is interesting to see that some forms of group identity
emerged. The group communication seemed to initiate a po-
tentially new identity as “joint late-blight managers,” while
initially, the farmers saw the disease as an individual problem
and the need for collective management more or less was a
new concept to them. A farmer stated, “When we communi-
cate, it motivated us to work cooperatively for our shared goal
which is to manage the disease that I now know I cannot do
alone.” This new form of identity is also reflected in the fol-
lowing statements when farmers cherished their new “expert”
status and claimed responsibility for educating other members
of the community that they believed had a different under-
standing of the disease and its management. On one of the
phone records, a farmer elaborated to his group members
“This chance is given us by God. So, what if our group mem-
bers discuss the potato late blight? Think about it, it is some-
thing that may help us and further, we can teach our spouses at
home.” A farmer from another group commented, “We have
to teach our society what we learned about the disease here.”
When it came down to the group level, farmers were ob-
served to share ideas on how to behave and act as one district
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collective. This quick identification of oneself as a member of
a particular group is lucid in the voice record, “Hello my group
how are you doing?What are you thinking?What is the status
of our group?” A farmer reminded his group members, “Put
the money in the envelope secretly without any advice from
others”. On the other hand, farmers were open to give or take
advice from their own groupmembers as an interviewed farm-
er illustrated, “Yes, people in my group were consulting about
my decision to spray or not to spray by phone. And I told them
my decision. They are my group members and since it is for
mutual benefit, telling them my own decisions to spray or not
to spray has no problem.” Although farmers understood that
their group performance was independent of other groups,
they still displayed a competitive attitude or wanted to perform
better than the others. In the interview, a farmer said, “We also
wanted to be better than other groups, be competitive.” A
recorded farmer uttered, “I have heard that one of the other
groups has contributed 400. My group members; please think
carefully.”
4.4 Implications of using the smartphones
Although the majority of participant farmers had never used
smartphones and internet before our experiment, with the brief
training, most of them were able to operate the smartphone
and the application without much difficulty. As a particular
type of communication platform, interviewed farmers men-
tioned some associated advantages and disadvantages that im-
pacted the nature and quality of their communication in their
efforts to collectively manage the disease and beyond. The
challenges were mainly technical and skill-related on using
the touch screen and the Voxer application, and the problem
of stable internet connectivity in some of the study sites.
Operating the smartphones was particularly difficult for older
farmer participants of the experiment. An interviewed farmer
commented, “The phone was difficult to use since we are not
very familiar with such type of phone.” “There was not much
problem, but while I was touching, I lost the Voxer on the
second day and could not receive and send a message” was a
statement from another farmer. Some of these problems had
consequences to their group performance according to a farm-
er who stated, “Three of us discussed how to get to the target
but two of our group members were not able to communicate
with us and because of those two, our group failed to manage
the disease.”
Opinions on the advantages, however, focus on the net-
working or connective features of the platform. Farmers men-
tioned interesting insights on the advantages of using the
smartphones by putting them into perspective with their usual
face-to-face communication. Emphasizing the connective
power of the platform, a farmer stated, “It would have been
difficult to meet up and share the different ideas, but because
of the phone it was not tedious for us.”Another farmer added,
“It helped me to discuss with my group members when I was
at my work without getting the guys physically. That means
we didn’t need to contact our group members in person to
discuss and share ideas about what to do.”
The connective function of the platform is clearly seen in
the phone conversations as farmers used the opportunity to
discuss and share experiences on production practices of po-
tato and other crops and on the importance of getting orga-
nized to deal with their market problems. Knowing that his
group members are from different villages, a farmer asked, “If
you have any experiences about potato from your area or from
other people, let’s share with each other.” Another farmer
responded, “Before planting a potato, we have to have our
plan including the way and number of tillage and the season
of planting. Then after, we have to apply fertilizer during
planting and upper dressing. Spraying four times is mandato-
ry.”. On the problem of unfair market and the need to get
organized to deal with powerful brokers dictating the market,
a farmer commented, “There is a serious problem in potato
marketing. There is no direct selling of potato to the traders so
far. We have been selling potato production through brokers
which is prohibiting us from getting the right price for the
production. It is brokers who are getting more benefits at the
expense of farmers.”Another farmer voiced, “Let us unite and
limit the interference of brokers in the market environment.”
If we look into the functional peculiarities of the use of the
smartphones as a group communication platform, one inter-
esting encounter relates to the ability of such platforms to
influence people to create a virtual identity or exhibit a sort
of different character from the way they might behave under
other means of communications such as face-to-face. While
discussing the perceived advantage of the platform, a farmer
said, “The phone has a great advantage, it helped me talk
about anything that is on my mind without any shame.
Some farmers were even singing to us.”
5 Discussion
5.1 The role of the communicative interventions
Drawing upon a broader perspective on communicative prac-
tices, our study experimented with the role of different types
of communicative interventions in the management of potato
late blight as a collective action problem. To this end, we
examined to what extent and how (1) technical information
about interdependency, (2) social monitoring information
with and without technical information about interdependen-
cy, and (3) interactive communication among farmers influ-
enced their collective action in managing the disease. As
highlighted earlier, previous studies on the role of communi-
cative interventions are largely concentrated in behavioral
economics and mainly attempted to measure the effect of
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social monitoring information and group communication as
distinct areas of research interest (Khadjavi et al. 2017;
Opdam et al. 2016; Hashim et al. 2017; Dietz et al. 2003;
Crawford 1998). Our review also failed to find a study that
set out to investigate the role of technical information about
interdependency involved in management practices either in
combination with other types of communicative interventions
or as one typical case. In this regard, it was our assumption
that in a context where farmers have very limited information
on the collective risk and benefit of individual management
practice, the provision of such information would trigger
farmers to better cooperate in overcoming their collective
problem. Our quantitative results demonstrated that the provi-
sion of technical information about interdependency did not
improve farmers’ collective action performance. The propor-
tion of farmers that were in groups reaching the threshold
(manage the disease) was about 25% lower relative to the
non-intervention condition even though this negative effect
was not statistically significant. Looking into the qualitative
information on the way farmers made sense of the technical
information as an opportunity to benefit from the spraying of
other farmers, having such information could encourage
farmers to work against the collective goal of managing the
disease.
It was also argued that additional social monitoring infor-
mation on spraying practices of others would further enhance
collective action in managing the disease. Our results again
revealed that having such additional information even worsen
farmers’ collective performance whereby the proportion of
farmers that were in groups reaching the threshold was signif-
icantly lower (p = 0.012) than the non-intervention condition.
Interestingly, farmers who were in groups only given social
monitoring information performed 29% relatively higher and
significantly better than the non-intervention condition. Our
hypothesis on the role of social monitoring information
(Hypothesis 3) was in view of existing inconsistency in liter-
ature on the effect of such type of information, and hence, its
effect could be influenced by whether or not farmers under-
stand the ecological characteristics of the disease that makes
its management a collective action problem. The result sup-
ports our hypothesis that the effect of social monitoring infor-
mation could be affected by farmers’ understanding of the
collective nature of the disease problem and its management.
It may be the case that if farmers are only provided with social
monitoring information, they could use the information to
pursue strategies that they think would maximize their income
without relating their decisions to their real-life situation or the
characteristics of the collective action problem at hand. As is
further illustrated in our qualitative analysis, what can be in-
ferred from the effect of both technical and social monitoring
information, in a situation where awareness of interdependen-
cy (technical information) promotes free-riding behavior,
knowing the less satisfactory collective performance (social
monitoring information) could further encourage farmers to
free-ride. When farmers that were in groups with both techni-
cal information and social monitoring information were given
a chance to interactively communicate, they performed signif-
icantly better (27%) than the farmer groups in the non-
intervention condition and about 65% higher than farmers that
were in the groups with both technical information and social
monitoring information.
Against this background, our finding on the role of techni-
cal information about interdependency by no means leads to a
conclusion that the provision of this type of information is
detrimental to collective action in the management of the dis-
ease. Neither does the positive effect of social monitoring
information lead to the suggestion that social monitoring of
management decisions alone would be a solution to overcome
collective action problems. Rather, as demonstrated in the
communicating group and the qualitative findings, it under-
scores the importance of a combination of communicative
interventions that goes beyond just providing information
and creates room for farmers to interact, learn, and coordinate
their actions towards a collective goal. As highlighted by
Leeuwis and Aarts (2011), beyond the provision of relevant
information, meaningful change depends on creating a space
for human interaction and negotiation, and its formation is
inherent ly dependent on an interac t ive form of
communication.
5.2 Mechanisms in interactive communication
Previous studies on collective action problems have hypothe-
sized or used qualitative case studies to explain the mecha-
nisms under which interactive communication could influence
collective action (Garicano and Wu 2012; Cardenas et al.
2004; Dietz et al. 2003; Ostrom andWalker 1991). Apart from
employing such conceptual perspectives to substantiate the
role of group communication, our study additionally
attempted to integrate and inductively investigate how the
provision of both technical and social monitoring information
influenced collective action performance as reported in the
quantitative findings. Through the analysis of interviews and
phone conversations, the study provided explanations on the
way farmers made sense of the information types to inform
their individual decisions. Interesting accounts were captured
that explained some of the underlying motives to pursue indi-
vidual goals rather than a collective one or vice versa. A new
appreciation of interdependency that stems from the collective
nature of managing the disease, and the chance to inform their
decisions based on the decision of others had a meaningful
impact in shaping their cooperative behaviors. This brings a
fresh perspective to existing literature that so far attempted to
explain the role of information only from the perspective of
social monitoring information or how knowledge on the pro-
pensity of others to cooperate influences collective action
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(Fischbacher and Gachter 2010; Croson and Shang 2008;
Croson 2007). Farmers in the communicating groups used
the opportunity to coordinate a collective strategy, to put pres-
sure on free-riders, and to create a sense of group identity that
explains the positive effect of the group communication on
collective action performance. Because of the experimental
design choice of our study, farmers in a group were anony-
mous and from the different statements of farmers, the ano-
nymity seemed to negatively influence the role of the group
communication especially in their attempt to discourage free-
riding behavior. Even so, they tried to use the opportunity to
arouse what Ostrom and Walker (1991) called “internal guilt”
on individuals who were believed to have shown non-
conforming behaviors. However, our study would not fall
short of recognizing the premise that the type of social pres-
sure in collective action problem situation is not only about
individuals’ perception of the wishes and norms of others but
also involves dynamics of power and enforcement whereby
the detection of individual behaviors becomes important
(Leeuwis and Aarts 2020; Cubitt et al. 2011; Ostrom 1990).
In general, having a good understanding of the underlying
mechanisms would help in the development of an empirically
validated theory that explains why communicative interven-
tions would be (in)efficient in the management of collective
action problems in a given situation. From a practical view-
point, this also provides an opportunity to improve or adapt
communicative intervention approaches around the manage-
ment of collective action problems. For instance, the fact that
some farmers tried to negatively influence other farmers by
bringing their real-life spraying practice is one such contextual
case that a communicative intervention could take into ac-
count to optimize its contextual relevance.
5.3 Trade-offs associated with smartphone use
Finally, our study also assessed the potential trade-offs of
using smartphones as a medium of option for group commu-
nication. Our aim to look into the smartphone as a communi-
cation tool in a wider communicative intervention was ratio-
nalized by the fact that the mechanisms underlying the role of
the group communication (e.g., coordinating collective strat-
egy, pressuring free-riding behavior, or creating a sense of
group identity) are considered to be consequences of the op-
portunity to communicate in general. However, it was in the
interest of this study to unravel the potential trade-offs that
could come along with the use of a particular type of commu-
nication platform. From this end, most of the disadvantages of
using the smartphones were related to skills on the proper use
of the smartphone and the problem of reliable internet connec-
tivity. As much as physical infrastructural and knowledge
gaps in the use of ICTs are common constraints mentioned
in many studies, it is also becoming less and less persistent
due to the growing investment and rapid ICT expansion in
rural Africa (Asongu and Boateng 2018; Maumbe and
Okello 2013; Adam 2012). Despite some challenges
expressed by few interviewed farmers, our quantitative results
also corroborated that previous exposure or being an owner of
a mobile phone or a smartphone was not a significant factor to
influence collective action in both the intervention and non-
intervention groups. In contrast, an important advantage of
using the smartphone relates to its connective power that
allowed farmers to discuss their strategies when they were
physically distant to each other. The ability of ICT to over-
come geographic barriers has already been an established no-
tion with the potential of facilitating new forms of collective
action or what Bennett and Segerberg (2012) call “connective
action.” Likewise, the use of smartphones has also signaled a
prospect for catalyzing wider connectivity beyond the com-
munity as farmers discussed other issues such as market prob-
lems and the idea of getting organized to deal with powerful
market actors. However, this also demonstrates that such new
forms of ICT-induced connectivity can also be utilized to push
other agendas that were not intended by a communicative
intervention.
Although it was not raised by many farmers, the idea that
the virtual platform encouraged people to speak their minds
which they could hesitate to do in face-to-face communication
evoked the notion of “digital dualism.” Jurgensen (2011)
highlighted that a separate digital and physical sphere affects
the way people behave that could potentially create a “second
self.” We believe that this could pique interest in future re-
search on understanding the diverse implications of ICT-
enabled communicative interventions in the management of
collective action problems.
5.4 External validity
Even though the anonymity among farmers ensured internal
validity by minimizing a potential bias that could have come
from farmers’ interaction in the non-communicating groups if
they had known each other, the conditions of the experiments
do not reflect the real-life of farmers. In reality, it is less likely
or not commonly the case that farmers in a community do not
know each other. In this regard, our case study was not free
from the enduring epistemic dilemma of choosing from or
balancing between internal and external validity. In addition,
for simplifying the game for farmers and logistical reasons,
the design took (not) spraying as the only important factor in
late blight occurrence, while in reality, other abiotic factors
(e.g., temperature, humidity, rainfall) play role in the likeli-
hood of disease occurrence. Future research can capitalize on
this by including, for instance, uncertainty element or multiple
scenarios to levels of disease occurrence under different envi-
ronmental conditions. Finally, in the experiment, the farmers
did not have to invest their own money in disease manage-
ment or group communication. The latter was paid for
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(internet and mobile data) with an average of 25 ETB or 0.85
Euro cents per farmer. As Ostrom (2012) noted, irrespective
of the means of communication, it is rare that the opportunity
to communicate is costless as someone has to invest money,
time, or effort to create and maintain arenas for communica-
tion. Likewise, the research project provided the initial
spraying investment of 400 ETB (13.60 Euro) per farmer.
When designing communicative interventions in collective
action problem situations, it is hence important to take into
account the sources for the costs of creating a communication
space and a common good provision investment.
6 Conclusion
Dealing with collective action problems such as the manage-
ment of late blight requires more than technical information
provision or about interdependencies involved inmanagement
practices of farmers. In fact, communication practices that are
mainly geared towards increasing farmers’ awareness of such
technical facts could negatively affect collective action.
Furthermore, providing social monitoring information about
the practices of others when there is already a weak collective
action could further promote non-cooperation in the manage-
ment of the disease. In light of this, expert advisory services
and/or provision of relevant technical and social information
have to be complemented with interactive communication and
deliberation processes that are internally governed ormanaged
by communities. This would help in making the best out of
advisory services and monitoring practices that could other-
wise have a chance to be counterproductive in managing col-
lective action problems.
From an analytical viewpoint, apart from showing the di-
rection or magnitude of relationships between communicative
interventions and collective action performance, employing
conceptual perspectives that open the black box and shed light
on what really happened during communicative interventions
is an important step in understanding how different types of
communicative practices facilitate or obstruct collective action
in a particular context.
The use of smartphones has demonstrated the potential for
such platforms in facilitating networking and connectivity
among specially and temporally scattered community mem-
bers. However, farmers’ attempt to use the platform for ad-
vancing other agendas would mean that communicative re-
search and/or development interventions need to take into
consideration any unintended consequences of using such
platforms and how these interplay with the envisioned objec-
tive of a communicative intervention in the management of
collective action problems.
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